Asymmetrical Attributions for Approach Versus Avoidance Behavior by Greitemeyer, Tobias & Weiner, Bernard
 http://psp.sagepub.com/
Bulletin
Personality and Social Psychology
 http://psp.sagepub.com/content/29/11/1371
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0146167203255766
 2003 29: 1371Pers Soc Psychol Bull
Tobias Greitemeyer and Bernard Weiner
Asymmetrical Attributions for Approach Versus Avoidance Behavior
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 
 Society for Personality and Social Psychology
 can be found at:Personality and Social Psychology BulletinAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/content/29/11/1371.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 What is This?
 
- Nov 1, 2003Version of Record >> 
 at LMU Muenchen on May 16, 2013psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
10.1177/0146167203255766 ARTICLEPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETINGreitemeyer , Weiner / ASYMMETRICA  ATTRIBUTIO S
Asymmetrical Attributions for
Approach Versus Avoidance Behavior
Tobias Greitemeyer
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
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Five studies examined responsibility inferences and/or person
and situation attributions in positively versus negatively
valenced motivational contexts. In Experiment 1, participants
received information about a teaching assistant who was prom-
ised a reward or threatened with a punishment when asked for
compliance with a requested transgression. The teaching assis-
tant was perceived as more responsible for complying given the
positive than the negative incentive. This finding was replicated
in Experiment 2 using different vignettes and incentives. Exper-
iment 3 revealed that the effect of incentive valence on perceived
responsibility for compliance remains significant when statisti-
cally controlling for perceived compliance rates. Experiment 4
then demonstrated that there are not only greater responsibility
judgments given a positive than a negative incentive but also
greater dispositional attributions. Finally, Experiment 5
revealed that a similar incentive valence effect is found in other
appetitive versus aversive motivational contexts. Theoretical
explanations of this phenomenon are discussed.
Keywords: attribution; compliance; responsibility; causation;
incentive
Earlier in the history of psychology, reward and pun-
ishment were construed as opposite sides of a coin and
symmetrical in their consequences. Reward was pre-
sumed to increase the probability of a prior response,
whereas punishment decreased that likelihood. To para-
phrase Thorndike (1911),
When a stimulus-response bond is followed by a satisfy-
ing state of affairs, the strength of that bond
increases . . . when a particular stimulus-response bond is
followed by an annoying state of affairs, the strength of
that bond is weakened. (p. 241)
But not all subsequent behaviorists shared the belief
that reward and punishment are mirror opposites, and
more broadly speaking, that appetitive and aversive set-
tings are conceptually symmetrical. Miller (1944), based
on his studies of approach-avoidance conflict, reasoned
that the slope of motivation for a positive incentive
decreases less as a function of distance from the desired
goal than does the strength of motivation to avoid a neg-
ative incentive. He contended that this was because
approach behavior is guided by internal stimuli, or
something about the organism, whereas avoidance
behavior is elicited by external cues, or something about
the environment. That is, he attributed the unequal
slopes to causes differing in locus.
More recently, views embracing the complexities of
reactions to reward and punishment and their lack of
symmetry have come to predominate thinking in this
area. This shift was fostered by the growth of cognitive
psychology and the incorporation of the meaning of
reward and punishment to the experiencing organism.
Attribution theorists, or those interested in the per-
ceived causes of outcomes, particularly have champi-
oned that the effects of reward and punishment depend
on the subjective interpretation of this information. For
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example, Meyer et al. (1979) argued that reward for suc-
cess at an easy task can lead to an inference by the
rewarded person that he has low ability, which is a perfor-
mance inhibitor (Bandura, 1977). On the other hand,
punishment for failure may communicate that the nega-
tive outcome is due to lack of effort, which implies that
the individual has the ability to accomplish the task.
These beliefs are associated with enhanced achievement
striving (Weiner, 1986). In sum, and in opposition to the
views expressed by Thorndike (1911), reward may
decrease, and punishment can increase, motivation.
These appear to be reliable conclusions (see, e.g., Gra-
ham & Barker, 1990).
Another pertinent line of research disconfirming the
traditional presumed consequences of reward concerns
the so-called undermining properties of positive incen-
tives. It has been contended that reward for behavior
may result in the actor ascribing a successful perfor-
mance to that reward rather than to the intrinsic positive
properties of the activity (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett,
1973). Discounting intrinsic interest, in turn, may
decrease indices of motivated performance, such as
choice of that activity and persistence in the face of fail-
ure (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; but see Cameron,
2001).
In a similar manner, a recent program of research,
which forms the empirical foundation for this article,
has documented that the consequences of reward versus
punishment are not symmetrical when offered as incen-
tives to comply with a request for a transgression.
Rodrigues (1995) and Rodrigues and Lloyd (1998)
reported that compliance given the promise of a reward
is more attributed to the person, and that individual is
considered more responsible for the transgression, than
given behavioral compliance when threatened with a
punishment. Specifically, for example, if a nurse carries
out the request of a doctor to administer a drug that has
not been officially approved, then the nurse is regarded
as more responsible for this transgression when the com-
pliance follows a promise of a pay raise, as opposed to a
threat that wages will be lowered if the drug is not admin-
istered. This asymmetrical effect was first reported by
Wells (1980) and subsequently replicated by Reeder and
Spores (1983), but Rodrigues and his colleagues were
the first to conduct a systematic series of studies docu-
menting this pattern of data (although his investigations
included a number of other sources of power and did
not focus on the reward vs. punishment issue).
Given the many implications of the asymmetrical
effects of reward and punishment in compliance set-
tings, and their pertinence to basic attributional princi-
ples, we considered this an important avenue of research
to pursue. Among the questions asked in this article are
the following:
1. Is this a reliable effect, that is, do greater inferences of
responsibility given compliance in situations of reward
relative to punishment replicate across a variety of trans-
gressions and incentives? Furthermore, will a similar
pattern of findings be observed in other appetitive ver-
sus aversive motivational contexts? For example, is ap-
proaching attractive food (or a good movie) more
attributed to internal causes than is avoiding unattrac-
tive food (or a bad movie)?
2. Are these effects due to differences in social norms asso-
ciated with the behavior? For example, if more nurses
are perceived as complying with the illegal drug request
given a threatened salary decrease than a promised sal-
ary increase, then the action in that condition is more
normative and will elicit a stronger situational judg-
ment, or alternately, the behavior in the reward condi-
tion is less normative and will give rise to a stronger
dispositional inference (Kelley, 1967).
Rodrigues (2001) and Wells (1980) were aware of this
possibility and attempted to avoid a perceived norm con-
founding (or contribution) when choosing some of
their stimulus situations. For example, to overcome this
problem, Rodrigues (2001) selected unequal stimulus
situations in the positive and negative incentive condi-
tions that were equated on compliance rates (e.g., a gain
of .50 cents for compliance vs. a loss of .25 cents for non-
compliance). However, this possible confound or expla-
nation is in need of much further study.
To examine these and other issues, five studies were
conducted. All follow a rather similar format. In the
majority of investigations, participants are given infor-
mation about compliance with a transgression request
when the incentive is either a promised reward or a
threatened punishment. Then, judgments of responsi-
bility for the transgression, and/or dispositional and sit-
uational attributions, are obtained. In addition, either
another group of participants or these same participants
provide data regarding perceived compliance rates to
the influence attempt. In this manner, the possible
effects of perceived social norms on the attributional
judgments can be determined.
In a final study, a noncompliance situation is described
within a positive or a negative motivational context.
Then, inferences about disposition versus situation con-
tributions to the action are gathered. In addition, judg-
ments regarding reactions in these contexts (equivalent
to compliance rates) are obtained.
The reader will find that the asymmetrical conse-
quences of reward and other positive motivational con-
texts versus punishment and other negative motivational
contexts on attributional judgments are quite robust. In
addition, there are various possible theoretical explana-
tions of this phenomenon, although these have not been
directly tested.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Method
There were two distinct parts of the experiment. In
Part 1, 43 students (25 women, 18 men, with an average
age of 22 years) from the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA), participated. They were arbitrarily
approached on campus and asked to fill out an experi-
mental questionnaire. Two participants who agreed
were eliminated due to a failure to respond to one or
more questions.
At the onset of the questionnaire, participants were
informed that they would be given a story in which a per-
son is asked to engage in a transgression. All participants
were given the following vignette:
A faculty member is teaching a large class. This person
approaches the teaching assistant (TA) and says that the
ratings have not been high enough and asks if the TA
would insert about 20 false ratings in the packet, even
though that is illegal. What the faculty member says to
the TA is given below. The TA complies and inserts 20
false ratings in the packet.
Participants then read 18 different incentives offered to
the TA by the faculty member; 9 were positive and 9 were
negative. The incentives were selected on the basis of pi-
lot testing revealing relative equality in compliance rates
between the two valence incentive conditions. A positive
incentive was operationalized as a reward for complying,
for example, “If you do this, I will write a strong letter of
recommendation for the job you applied for next year.”
A negative incentive indicated a threat for not comply-
ing, for example, “If you don’t do this, I will write a weak
letter of recommendation for the job you applied for
next year.” The content of the positive incentives was
matched by a corresponding negative incentive (see Ta-
ble 1). Each participant responded to all 18 incentives.
Hence, a 2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of incentive)
factorial design with repeated measures on both factors
was employed. The incentives were presented in one of
two orders. Half of the participants read the incentives in
a random order, whereas the other half of the partici-
pants read the incentives in the opposite order.
Each incentive was immediately followed by two items
tapping perceived responsibility. Using Likert-type
scales, respondents indicated “How responsible do you
hold the TA for complying with this request?” (1 = not at
all responsible to 9 = very much responsible) and “To what
degree is the TA at fault for this transgression?” (1 = not at
all to 9 = absolutely).
As already indicated, judgments of responsibility are
theoretically associated with compliance rates; that is,
persons will be perceived as more responsible when
compliance rates are low (indicating personal causa-
tion), whereas persons will be perceived as less
responsible when compliance rates are high (indicating
situational causation) (see Kelley, 1967). Hence, in Part
2 of the investigation, 28 students (23 women, 5 men,
with a mean age of 23 years) recruited on the UCLA cam-
pus were given the vignette described above as well as the
18 incentives, in two random orders. None of those stu-
dents participated in Part 1 of the experiment. For each
incentive, they were asked to indicate the percentage of
TAs who would comply with the request.
Results and Discussion
Compliance rates. A 2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of
incentive) ANOVA with repeated measures on both fac-
tors revealed a significant main effect for kind of incen-
tive, F(8, 216) = 40.73, p < .001, η2 = .60.1,2 As shown in
Table 1, some incentives (e.g., high vs. low grade on final
thesis) yielded more compliance than others (e.g., do vs.
not do a favor). More importantly, there was no signifi-
cant main effect for incentive valence, F(1, 27) = 2.44, p =
.13,η2 = .08, indicating that the compliance ratings in the
positive (M = 52.3%) and the negative (M = 48.6%)
incentive conditions are comparable (see Table 1).
Responsibility ratings. Inasmuch as ratings of perceived
responsibility and fault were highly correlated for the 18
incentives (M r = .84, range = .70 to .93), these measures
were combined to determine perceived responsibility.
The mean ratings of perceived responsibility as a func-
tion of the different positive and negative incentives are
shown in Table 1.
An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for
incentive valence, F(1, 40) = 23.47, p < .001, η2 = .37. As
expected, there were higher ratings of perceived respon-
sibility in the positive incentive condition (M = 7.14)
than in the negative incentive condition (M = 6.20). This
held true for every incentive pairing. There was also a sig-
nificant main effect for kind of incentive on responsibil-
ity ratings, F(8, 320) = 4.31, p < .01, η2 = .10. The compli-
ance ratings, taken from the other group of participants,
provided a useful index to scale these incentive situa-
tions. In accordance with attributional predictions,
higher estimated base rates of compliance associated
with the incentives yielded lower ratings of perceived
responsibility, r(18) = –.32.3 The ANOVA also yielded a
significant Incentive Valence × Kind of Incentive (com-
pliance rates) interaction, F(8, 320) = 4.13, p < .001, η2 =
.09 (see Figure 1). For the negative incentives, higher
rates of compliance were associated with lower rates of
perceived responsibility, F(8, 320) = 6.44, p < .001, η2 =
.14, r(9) = –.85. In contrast, given a positive incentive,
rates of compliance and perceived responsibility were
not significantly associated, F(8, 320) = 1.38, p = .21, η2 =
.03, r(9) = –.36. To put it differently, the effect of incen-
tive valence on responsibility judgments is more pro-
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nounced given high rates of compliance than when
there are low rates of compliance. We will discuss these
and other data after presenting all of the investigations.
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the pattern
of results just reported. The design and procedure of
Experiment 2 were similar to that of Experiment 1. How-
ever, different vignettes and incentives were used.
Method
Experiment 2 consisted of the same two parts as
Experiment 1. In Part 1, 43 students (25 women, 18 men,
with an average age of 23 years) recruited on campus at
UCLA participated. All were given the following two
vignettes describing a nurse (from Rodrigues & Lloyd,
1998) and an airline ticket agent:
A doctor asks a nurse to give a patient a drug that has not
yet been approved, even though that is illegal. What the
doctor says to the nurse is given below. The nurse com-
plies and gives the patient the drug.
The second vignette read as follows:
An executive of an airline company who is in charge of
ticketing needs a ride on a plane, but other people are
on the waiting list to also get on the plane. The airline
executive asks the ticket agent in the department to put
her/him first on the list to get on, even though that is ille-
gal and against airline policy. What the airline executive
says to the ticket agent is given below. The ticket agent
complies and puts the airline executive first on the list.
There were four positive and four negative incentives of-
fered to the nurse by the doctor (see the top half of Table
1374 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
TABLE 1: Mean Ratings for Rates of Compliance, Perceived Responsibility, Dispositional Attributions, and Situational Attributions as a Function
of Kinds of Positive and Negative Incentives (Experiments 1, 3, and 4)
Experiment 3
Experiment 1 (n = 37) Experiment 4 (n = 47)
Positive/Negative Incentive C (n = 28) R (n = 41) C R C R D S
I will make sure you get the fellowship you applied for next year. 74.1 6.83 54.3 7.24 55.7 6.68 6.62 6.94
I will make sure that you don’t get the fellowship you applied for next year. 66.2 5.91 51.0 6.35 57.6 4.45 4.85 7.21
I will give you a very high grade on your final thesis. 66.8 7.28 50.4 7.32 57.6 7.32 7.00 6.55
I will give you a poor grade on your final thesis. 70.1 5.60 50.1 6.41 62.2 4.77 4.74 7.38
I will see to it that you get the job you applied for next year. 69.2 6.93 51.9 7.49 58.0 7.15 6.94 6.79
I will see to it that you won’t get the job you applied for next year. 66.8 5.48 52.9 6.81 59.3 4.87 5.09 7.40
I will write a strong letter of recommendation for the job you applied for
next year. 62.9 7.13 45.6 7.35 45.7 6.96 6.87 6.32
I will write a weak letter of recommendation for the job you applied for
next year. 49.5 6.37 45.1 6.81 40.0 5.87 5.74 6.34
I will see to it that you will get some extra TA money. 46.4 7.50 39.7 7.81 37.0 7.26 7.36 6.17
I will see to it that you get less TA money. 55.8 6.21 37.4 7.16 46.9 5.89 5.94 6.13
I will make sure you get an easy TA-ship next year. 45.1 7.11 36.2 7.92 35.6 7.15 6.70 6.57
I will make sure you get a difficult TA-ship next year. 34.1 5.95 40.7 7.30 30.4 5.60 5.91 6.47
I won’t ask you to help with the grading and other work during the final
exam. 33.3 7.26 30.5 8.16 34.6 7.04 6.85 5.66
I will give you a great deal of work with the grading and other tasks regarding
the final exam. 38.9 6.49 36.4 7.54 31.8 6.04 5.79 6.17
I will do you a favor. 42.0 7.27 40.5 8.22 33.0 7.38 7.43 4.89
I won’t do you a favor. 22.6 7.10 40.8 8.22 20.2 7.09 7.02 5.32
I will be very grateful. 30.5 6.95 27.1 8.05 28.5 7.00 7.00 4.66
I will be very angry. 33.6 6.67 28.4 8.05 29.6 6.00 6.57 5.85
NOTE: The positive incentive followed the words: “If you do this”; the negative incentive followed the words: “If you don’t do this.” C = compliance,
R = responsibility, D = dispositional attribution, S = situational attribution.
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Figure 1 Mean judgments of responsibility as a function of incentive
valence and kind of valence (Study 1).
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2). In addition, there were three positive and three nega-
tive incentives offered to the ticket agent by the airline
executive (see the bottom half of Table 2). Pilot testing
revealed a relative equality in compliance rates between
the two valence incentive conditions.
In Part 2, 31 other UCLA students recruited on cam-
pus (23 women, 8 men, with an average age of 22 years)
responded to the two vignettes and the corresponding
14 incentives described above. The same dependent
measures were used as in Experiment 1: two responsibility-
related items in Part 1 and compliance rates in Part 2.
Vignette order as well as incentive order was counterbal-
anced in both parts, such that half of the participants
read the vignettes and the incentives in a random order,
whereas the other half of the participants read the
vignettes and the incentives in the opposite order.
Results and Discussion
Compliance rates. For the nurse vignette, an ANOVA
showed a significant main effect for kind of incentive,
F(3, 90) = 55.41, p < .001, η2 = .65. As can be seen in the
top half of Table 2, some incentives (e.g., strong vs. weak
letter of recommendation) yielded more compliance
than others (e.g., do vs. not do a favor). Of greater
importance, there was a nonsignificant main effect for
incentive valence, F(1, 30) = 0.87, p = .36,η2 = .03, indicat-
ing that the compliance ratings in the positive (M =
29.3%) and the negative (M = 31.0%) incentive condi-
tions are comparable (see the top half of Table 2).
For the ticket agent vignette, an ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect for kind of incentive, F(2, 60) =
41.51, p < .001, η2 = .58, indicating again that the incen-
tives differed in strength or perceived compliance rating
(see the bottom half of Table 2). Again, no significant
main effect for incentive valence was found, F(1, 30) =
2.66, p = .12,η2 = .08, with relatively equal compliance rat-
ings in the positive (M = 57.2%) and the negative (M =
53.6%) incentive conditions (see the bottom half of
Table 2).
Responsibility ratings. Ratings of perceived responsibil-
ity and fault were highly correlated for the eight incen-
tives used in the nurse scenario (M r = .79, range = .63 to
.93) and as well for the six incentives used in the airline
executive scenario (M r = .80, range = .70 to .89). Thus,
these measures were combined to determine perceived
responsibility.
For the nurse vignette, an ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on both factors revealed a significant main effect
for incentive valence, F(1, 42) = 36.69, p < .001, η2 = .47.
Replicating the finding from Experiment 1, there were
higher ratings of perceived responsibility in the positive
incentive condition (M = 6.88) than in the negative
incentive condition (M = 5.91), holding over all four
incentive types. Furthermore, there was also a significant
main effect for kind of incentive, F(3, 126) = 13.00, p <
.001, η2 = .24. Higher estimated base rates of compliance
(as determined again from a separate group of partici-
pants) were associated with lower ratings of perceived
responsibility (see the top half of Table 2). The ANOVA
also yielded a significant Incentive Valence × Kind of
Incentive interaction, F(3, 126) = 10.03, p < .001, η2 = .19
(see Figure 2, left panel). Higher rates of compliance
linked to the incentive were associated with lower rates
of perceived responsibility for the negative incentives,
F(3, 126) = 17.97, p < .001, η2 = .30, whereas rates of com-
pliance and perceived responsibility were not signifi-
cantly associated for the positive incentives, F(3, 126) =
1.24, p = .30, η2 = .03.
For the ticket agent vignette, an ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect for incentive valence, F(1, 42) =
37.21, p < .001,η2 = .47. There were higher ratings of per-
ceived responsibility in the positive incentive condition
(M = 6.63) than in the negative incentive condition (M =
5.12), again describing all incentive types. Furthermore,
there was a significant main effect for kind of incentive,
F(2, 84) = 10.31, p < .001, η2 = .20. Higher estimated base
rates of compliance yielded lower ratings of perceived
responsibility. The ANOVA also revealed a significant
Incentive Valence × Kind of Incentive interaction, F(2,
84) = 7.19, p < .01, η2 = .15 (see Figure 2, right panel).
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TABLE 2: Mean Ratings for Rates of Compliance and Perceived Re-
sponsibility as a Function of Kinds of Positive and Nega-
tive Incentives (Experiment 2)
Compliance Responsibility
Positive/Negative Incentive (N = 31) (N = 43)
Nurse vignette
I will see to it that you get a promotion,
a big raise, and 2 weeks extra vacation. 44.7 6.61
I will see to it that you get laid off. 56.7 4.59
I will write a strong letter of
recommendation for the job you
applied for next year. 43.9 6.95
I will write a weak letter of
recommendation for the job
you applied for next year. 44.8 5.72
I will give you the weekend off. 15.7 7.07
I won’t give you the weekend off. 14.5 6.72
I will do you a favor. 12.9 6.88
I won’t do you a favor. 8.2 6.62
Ticket agent vignette
I will see to it that you get a promotion,
a big raise, and 2 weeks extra vacation. 68.7 6.52
I will see to it that you get laid off. 67.4 4.06
I will see to it that you get a raise. 64.4 6.67
I will see to it that you don’t get a raise. 54.6 5.56
I will give you the weekend off. 38.5 6.70
I won’t give you the weekend off. 38.8 5.73
NOTE: The positive incentive followed the words: “If you do this”; the
negative incentive followed the words: “If you don’t do this.”
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Higher rates of compliance were associated with lower
rates of perceived responsibility for the negative incen-
tives, F(2, 84) = 12.17, p < .001, η2 = .23. In contrast, rates
of compliance and perceived responsibility were not sig-
nificantly associated for the positive incentives, F(2, 84) =
0.32, p = .73, η2 = .01.
In sum, the findings from Experiment 1 were fully
replicated using different vignettes and different incen-
tives. Persons are perceived as more responsible for com-
plying to violate a rule when they are offered a positive
incentive than when they are offered a negative incen-
tive. In addition, compliance is not associated with
incentive valence. However, inasmuch as participants
indicated either rates of compliance or perceived
responsibility in a between-subjects design, it could not
be determined whether the effect of incentive valence
on perceived responsibility remains significant when sta-
tistically controlling for compliance rates; that is, it is not
known whether differences in compliance rates might
mediate the effect of incentive valence on responsibility,
even though compliance rate was not related as a main
effect to incentive valence. Testing this question was the
primary goal of Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants were 16 female and 21 male students
recruited on campus at UCLA. The mean age of the sam-
ple was 23 years. Participants received the same TA-
related vignette and incentives as used in Experiment 1.
Hence, a 2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of incentive)
factorial design with repeated measures on both factors
was employed. Inasmuch as perceived responsibility and
perceptions of fault were highly correlated in the previ-
ous experiments, only the responsibility item was used in
the present study, along with the compliance question.
Half of the participants responded first to all responsibil-
ity questions and then to all compliance questions. The
remaining half of the participants responded in the
opposite order. The incentives were presented in one of
two orders, as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Compliance rates. An ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect for kind of incentive, F(8, 288) = 18.88, p <
.001, η2 = .34. As can be seen in Table 1, some incentives
yielded more compliance than others. In contrast, no
significant main effect for incentive valence was found,
F(1, 36) = 0.01, p = .91, η2 = .00. There were nearly equal
compliance ratings in the positive (M = 40.5%) and the
negative (M = 40.8%) incentive conditions (see Table 1).
Responsibility ratings. Mean ratings for all incentives
are displayed in Table 1. An ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for incentive valence, F(1, 36) = 11.07, p
< .01, η2 = .24. There were higher ratings of perceived
responsibility in the positive incentive condition (M =
7.73) than in the negative incentive condition (M =
7.18). Furthermore, there was also a significant main
effect for kind of incentive, F(8, 288) = 10.16, p < .001, η2
= .24. Higher estimated base rates of compliance that
were linked to the incentives yielded lower ratings of
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Figure 2 Mean judgments of responsibility as a function of incentive valence and kind of valence for the nurse and the ticket agent vignette
(Study 2).
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perceived responsibility (see Table 1), r(37) = –.20.4 The
ANOVA also yielded a significant Incentive Valence ×
Kind of Incentive interaction, F(8, 288) = 2.08, p < .05, η2
= .06. For the negative incentives, higher rates of compli-
ance were associated with lower rates of perceived
responsibility, F(8, 288) = 9.57, p < .001, η2 = .21, r(37) =
–.27. This tendency also was noted for the positive incen-
tives, F(8, 288) = 4.44, p < .001,η2 = .11, r(37) = –.14, but it
was not as pronounced.
To test whether differences in compliance rates medi-
ate the effect of incentive valence on perceived responsi-
bility, a 2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of incentive)
ANCOVA with repeated measures on both factors, using
the compliance rates for each incentive as covariates, was
performed on the data. The pattern of results remained
unchanged. Most important, the significant main effect
for incentive valence was inappreciably reduced after
controlling for compliance, F(1, 35) = 10.86, p < .01, η2 =
.24. In addition, the main effect of kind of incentive, F(8,
287) = 4.15, p < .001, η2 = .10, as well as the Incentive
Valence ×Kind of Incentive interaction, F(8, 287) = 2.10,
p < .05, η2 = .06, remained significant.
In sum, Experiment 3 replicated the findings from
the previous experiments. There were higher responsi-
bility judgments when a person was offered a positive
incentive for complying to transgress than when offered
a negative incentive. Extending the conclusions from
Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 revealed that this
finding was not mediated by differences in compliance
rates.
Thus far, it has been determined that a person is per-
ceived as more responsible for complying given a posi-
tive than a negative incentive. This theoretically could be
because compliance given a positive incentive gives rise
to dispositional attributions and/or because compliance
given a negative incentive generates situation attributions.
The aim of Experiment 4 is to separate dispositional and
situational attributions, or the components that contrib-
ute to responsibility beliefs.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants were 28 female and 19 male students
recruited on campus at UCLA. The mean age of the sam-
ple was 25 years. Participants received the same TA-
related vignette and incentives as used in Experiments 1
and 3. Hence, a 2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of incen-
tive) factorial design with repeated measures on both
factors was employed. Perceived responsibility and com-
pliance rates were assessed from the same participants,
as in Experiment 3. Two additional questions measured
dispositional and situational causation. The correspond-
ing questions were, “To what extent is this compliance
due to something about the TA (his personality, traits,
etc.)?” and “To what extent is this compliance due to
something about the situation (the incentive offered,
the relation between teacher and TA, etc.)?” Question
order was counterbalanced so that approximately half of
the participants answered either the responsibility,
dispositional causation, and situational causation ques-
tions and responded then to the compliance questions,
whereas the remaining participants answered the ques-
tions in the opposite order. Furthermore, the incentives
were presented in one of two orders, as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Compliance rates. An ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect for kind of incentive, F(8, 368) = 24.74, p <
.001, η2 = .35, indicating that some incentives yielded
more compliance than others (see Table 1). In addition,
there was no significant main effect for incentive
valence, F(1, 46) = 0.28, p = .60, η2 = .01. The compliance
ratings in the positive (M = 42.9%) and the negative (M =
42.0%) incentive conditions were virtually equal (see
Table 1).
Responsibility ratings. The pattern of results was
entirely consistent with the previous findings. An
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for incentive
valence, F(1, 46) = 48.89, p < .001,η2 = .52. Higher ratings
of perceived responsibility were found in the positive
incentive condition (M = 7.10) than in the negative
incentive condition (M = 5.62). Furthermore, there was
also a significant main effect for kind of incentive, F(8,
368) = 7.73, p < .001,η2 = .14. Higher estimated base rates
of compliance were associated with lower ratings of per-
ceived responsibility (see Table 1), r(47) = –.22. The
ANOVA also yielded a significant Incentive Valence ×
Kind of Incentive interaction, F(8, 368) = 8.69, p < .001,
η2 = .16. For the negative incentives, higher rates of com-
pliance were associated with lower rates of perceived
responsibility, F(8, 368) = 12.33, p < .001, η2 = .21, r(47) =
–.38. In contrast, compliance rates were not significantly
associated with perceived responsibility for the positive
incentives, F(8, 368) = 1.35, p = .22,η2 = .03, r(47) = –.17.
Dispositional causation. The general pattern of results
for the dispositional ratings closely parallels the findings
when responsibility is the dependent measure. Indeed,
the correlation, across vignettes, between responsibility
inferences and dispositional judgments is r = .96, so that
these two may not have been construed as distinct. An
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for incentive
valence, F(1, 46) = 45.76, p < .001, η2 = .50. There were
higher ratings of perceived dispositional causation in
the positive incentive condition (M = 6.97) than in the
negative incentive condition (M = 5.74). There was also a
significant main effect for kind of incentive, F(8, 368) =
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7.26, p < .001, η2 = .14. Higher estimated base rates of
compliance yielded lower ratings of perceived dis-
positional causation (see Table 1), r(47) = –.23. The
ANOVA also yielded a significant Incentive Valence ×
Kind of Incentive interaction, F(8, 368) = 5.87, p < .001,
η2 = .12 (see Figure 3, left panel). For the negative incen-
tives, higher rates of compliance were related to lower
rates of perceived dispositional causation, F(8, 368) =
10.51, p < .001, η2 = .19, r(47) = –.36. In contrast, compli-
ance rates were not significantly related to perceived
dispositional causation for the positive incentives, F(8,
368) = 1.77, p = .08, η2 = .04, r(47) = –.17.
Situational causation. An ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for incentive valence, F(1, 46) = 11.33, p
< .01,η2 = .20. There were lower ratings of perceived situ-
ational causation in the positive incentive condition (M
= 6.06) than in the negative incentive condition (M =
6.48). There was also a significant main effect for kind of
incentive, F(8, 368) = 15.43, p < .001,η2 = .25. Higher esti-
mated base rates of compliance yielded higher ratings of
perceived situational causation (see Table 1), r(47) = .37.
The ANOVA also yielded a moderately significant Incen-
tive Valence × Kind of Incentive interaction, F(8, 368) =
2.71, p < .01, η2 = .06 (see Figure 3, right panel), with the
slope slightly steeper for positive incentives.
Incentive valence and causation. To test whether differ-
ences in perceived dispositional causation mediate the
effect of incentive valence on perceived responsibility, a
2 (incentive valence) × 9 (kind of incentive) ANCOVA,
using perceived dispositional causation for each incen-
tive as a covariate, was performed on the data. Most
important, the main effect for incentive valence on
responsibility was no longer significant when controlling
for dispositional causation, F(1, 45) = 2.87, p = .10, η2 =
.06. This would be expected given the very high correla-
tion between these ratings. The ANCOVA has some
meaning, nonetheless, when compared with the situa-
tion ratings and their effects. A 2 (incentive valence) × 9
(kind of incentive) ANCOVA using perceived situational
causation for each incentive as a covariate also was per-
formed on the data. The significant main effect for
incentive valence on responsibility remained after con-
trolling for situational causation, F(1, 45) = 31.39, p <
.001, η2 = .41.
In sum, the pattern of results from the previous stud-
ies was replicated: Higher responsibility judgments were
made given compliance in situations of positive incen-
tive relative to negative incentive. Experiment 4 also
revealed, which was not shown before, that there were
not only greater responsibility judgments given a positive
incentive but also greater attributions to dispositional
causation and lower situation attributions. However, the
effect of incentive valence on perceived responsibility
did not remain when controlling for differences in judg-
ments of dispositional causation, whereas the responsi-
bility judgments were relatively unaffected when judg-
ments of situational causation were partialed out. This
suggests that perceptions of dispositional rather than sit-
uational causal beliefs were driving the responsibility
judgments.
Thus far, it has been shown across a variety of trans-
gressions and incentives that greater attributions to the
person are made given compliance in situations of posi-
tive incentive relative to negative incentive. In the last
study, whether a similar finding can be observed in non-
compliance situations within appetitive versus aversive
motivational contexts will be tested.
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Figure 3 Mean judgments of dispositional and situational causation as a function of incentive valence and kind of valence (Study 4).
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EXPERIMENT 5
Method
Participants were 51 students (22 women, 29 men,
with a mean age of 26 years) recruited on campus at
UCLA. They were given 22 motivational situations (see
Table 3). Eleven were appetitive (e.g., “John is invited to
a good restaurant and eats his entire meal”) and 11 were
aversive (e.g., “John is invited to a poor restaurant and
leaves some food”). The situations were selected on the
basis of pilot testing revealing relative equality in per-
ceived rates of engagement in the paired behaviors.
Thus, a 2 (motivational context: appetitive vs. aversive) ×
11 (kind of situation) factorial design with repeated
measures on both factors was employed. Participants
responded to three questions: “What percentage of per-
sons would engage in the same behavior?” “To what
extent is this behavior due to something about John?” (1
= not at all to 9 = very much), and “To what extent is this
behavior due to something about the situation?” (1 = not
at all to 9 = very much). Question order and situational
order were counterbalanced. Approximately half of the
participants responded first to all dispositional and situa-
tional causation questions and then to all behavior rates
questions, whereas the remaining participants responded
in the opposite order. The situations were presented in
one of two orders.
Results and Discussion
Behavior rates. An ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect for kind of situation, F(10, 490) = 18.47, p < .001,η2
= .27, indicating that the situations differed in the per-
ceived likelihood of engaging in the behavior (see Table
3). Furthermore, a nonsignificant main effect for moti-
vational context was found, F(1, 49) = 0.44, p = .51, η2 =
.01. There were relatively equal behavior ratings in the
appetitive (M = 69.1%) and the aversive (M = 68.0%) sit-
uations (see Table 3).
Dispositional causation. An ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant main effect for motivational context, F(1, 50) =
37.13, p < .001,η2 = .43. There were higher ratings of per-
ceived dispositional causation in the appetitive (M =
6.53) than in the aversive situation condition (M = 5.74),
again across all incentive types. There was also a signifi-
cant main effect for kind of situation, F(10, 500) = 5.03, p
< .001, η2 = .09. Higher estimated base rates of behavior
yielded lower ratings of perceived dispositional causa-
tion (see Table 3), r(51) = –.14.
Situational causation. The ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for kind of situation, F(10, 500) = 2.89, p
< .01, η2 = .06. Higher estimated base rates of behavior
yielded higher ratings of perceived situational causation
(see Table 3), r(51) = .21, but no main effect was found
for motivational context, F(1, 50) = 0.57, p = .45, η2 = .01.
There were relatively equal ratings of perceived situa-
tional causation in the appetitive situation condition (M
= 7.09) and in the aversive situation condition (M =
7.04). Furthermore, the Motivational Context × Kind of
Situation interaction was weakly significant, F(10, 500) =
2.29, p < .05, η2 = .04, with the slope slightly steeper for
aversive situations.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
There are at least five features of the present studies
that represent advances on previous investigations con-
cerning the reward-punishment asymmetry hypothesis.
First, it was shown that the asymmetrical consequences
of reward and punishment on perceptions of responsi-
bility and attributions to the person are reliable across a
variety of incentives and requested behaviors. Second,
all of the experiments investigating compliance settings
revealed not only stable main effects of incentive valence
but also significant interactions between incentive
valence and kind of incentive: For the negative incen-
tives, higher rates of compliance were associated with
lower attributions to the person, whereas rates of compli-
ance and person attributions were not as strongly associ-
ated for the positive incentives. Third, it has been con-
clusively determined that the asymmetrical effects of
reward and punishment on responsibility judgments
and person attributions are not due to differences in per-
ceived rates of compliance. None of the experiments
revealed significant differences between the positive and
negative incentives employed in the present studies in
terms of compliance rates, indicating that the incentives
were equivalent in strength. It also was shown that the
effect of incentive valence on person attributions
remained significant when statistically controlling for
compliance rates. Wells (1980) suggested that erroneous
assumptions about the base rate for compliance medi-
ated the asymmetry phenomenon, that is, the asymmet-
rical effects of reward and punishment on person attri-
bution are based on unequal norms, which yield
different dispositional inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965;
Kelley, 1967). This explanation for the asymmetrical
effects of reward and punishment is not empirically sup-
ported by the present studies. Fourth, it appears that the
responsibility differences found in Experiments 1
through 4 are due to dispositional inferences rather
than to situational attributions. And fifth, Experiment 5
revealed that the asymmetrical attributional effects of a
positive versus a negative motivational context appear in
noncompliance settings, that is, there were greater attri-
butions to the person given an appetitive versus an
aversive motivational context.
In spite of the strength of the relations reported here,
one must be cautious about the meaning of the empiri-
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cal findings given that a similar vignette methodology
was employed in all the studies, and it is not without
shortcomings. For example, the positive and negative
incentives used here were equated only on compliance
rates, leaving open the possibility that they differed in
some other respect that would confound the conclu-
sions. For example, the vignettes in Studies 1 through 4
described an incentive offered to another. Perhaps the
incentive chosen implies something about the disposi-
tion or the beliefs of the targeted person (e.g., a punish-
ment might suggest that the potential transgressor is per-
ceived as having a less favorable attitude toward the
transgression than does the offer of a reward). This
exemplifies one type of confound in that the stimuli dif-
fer not only in valence but also in the information con-
veyed about the transgressor that would be reflected in
person inferences. In addition, the dependent variables
were simple judgments on a constructed scale, leading
one to wonder whether the participants were, for exam-
ple, construing responsibility as different from ratings of
dispositional involvement. In the remainder of the dis-
cussion, we proceed as if the data were true and not arti-
facts of the chosen methodology, but we recognize limi-
tations that the reader should bear in mind.
If one thinks of explanation in terms of proximal
mechanisms or processes, then attribution theorists
have a few explanations of the data reported here. For
example, given a transgression for a positive incentive,
or behavior within a positive motivational context, the
fundamental attributional error (Ross & Nisbett, 1991)
or a disposition bias (Jones & Davis, 1965) is displayed.
That is, observers attribute the behavior to the person
and go from the act to the disposition. Especially notable
in this regard is that even given a positive incentive con-
dition that gives rise to very high perceived compliance
rates, which are thought to foster situational attribu-
tions, observers nonetheless attribute the compliance
behavior to something about the person. That is, social
norms in some instances have little effect on
attributional beliefs. On the other hand, given negative
incentives, or the presence of potentially aversive conse-
quences, dispositional ascriptions are less displayed, par-
ticularly when given high compliance rates. Thus, the
data, somewhat inadvertently, point out some of the
boundaries of two basic and oft-cited attributional prin-
ciples. In contrast to attributional beliefs, behavior con-
sistent with social norms nevertheless may be attributed
to the person, and compliance behavior given the possi-
bility of negative consequences does not foster act-to-
disposition inferences.
Still other attributionally guided ways of discussing
the data make use of the concepts of insufficient and suf-
ficient justification, or necessary and sufficient causal
schema (see Kelley, 1973). Given positive incentives, the
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TABLE 3: Mean Ratings for Engagement in the Same Behavior, Dispositional Attributions, and Situational Attributions as a Function of Kinds of
Appetitive and Aversive Situations (Experiment 5)
Appetitive/Aversive Situation (N = 51) B D S
John turns on the television and sees an exciting show, so he stays tuned until the end of the program. 81.1 5.73 7.41
John turns on the television and sees a boring show, so he turns the channel. 84.0 4.96 7.24
John has fun going out on a blind date with a girl he finds interesting. 79.5 6.49 7.53
John does not have fun going out on a blind date with a girl he does not find interesting. 72.5 6.24 7.10
John is invited to a good restaurant and eats his entire meal. 79.1 6.06 7.00
John is invited to a poor restaurant and leaves some food. 72.0 5.06 7.16
John goes to a nightclub and likes the music. John dances for hours. 70.4 6.96 7.33
John goes to a nightclub and does not like the music. John dances only a short time. 72.3 5.96 7.31
John is taking a hiking trip. The weather is great and John walks an extra distance. 65.8 6.92 6.96
John is taking a hiking trip. The weather is poor and John cuts the trip short. 73.1 5.65 7.25
John is attending an interesting lecture and follows the lecture closely. 69.3 6.80 6.86
John is attending a boring lecture and does not follow the lecture very closely. 69.4 5.73 6.86
John is the owner of a company and has employees that do exceptional work. John gives them a bonus at the end
of the year. 55.9 6.80 6.69
John is the owner of a company and has employees that do unsatisfactory work. John does not give them a bonus
at the end of the year. 77.7 5.51 7.31
John is going to surf at the beach. The waves are big so he surfs the entire day. 63.3 6.76 7.25
John is going to surf at the beach. The waves are small so he surfs just a short time. 65.9 5.75 7.45
John is watching a play with talented actors. John gives them a standing ovation. 77.5 6.02 7.12
John is watching a play with bad actors. John applauds very little at the end. 53.9 5.67 6.43
John enjoys a course in school and gets a high grade in his class. 72.0 6.78 6.90
John does not enjoy a course in school and gets a low grade in his class. 52.1 6.63 6.24
John extends his vacation when staying in an inexpensive luxurious hotel. 47.0 6.51 6.98
John cuts his vacation short when staying in an expensive but not very nice hotel. 55.0 5.96 7.08
NOTE: B = engagement in the same behavior, D = dispositional attribution, S = situational attribution.
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judgments indicate that the behavior would not be
undertaken unless the person was of a certain disposi-
tion; that is, the positive incentive is insufficient to cause
the action, suggesting the use of a multiple necessary
causal schema. On the other hand, given a negative
motivational context, the presence of aversive incentives
is more likely to be perceived as sufficient to cause the
behavior, that is, the role of the person is relatively dis-
counted, therefore implying the use of a multiple suffi-
cient causal schema.
Although the mechanisms and processes mentioned
above can be used to account for the reported data, their
use as explanations is somewhat circular in that they
merely describe the findings, albeit within the more gen-
eral conceptual framework of attribution theory. How,
then, can the data be explained when one asks, “What
drives the activation of the different cognitive pro-
cesses?” “Why do positive more than negative incentives
foster act-to-disposition inferences or use of multiple
necessary causal rules?” Three possible explanations
may be derived from legal theory, Lewinian theory, and
prospect theory.
Legal theory. In the law, duress is regarded as a mitiga-
tor of responsibility (see LaFave & Scott, 1986, Chap. 5);
that is, if someone is illegally forced to do (or forbear)
some act by the threat of violence or fear of serious
injury, then that person is considered not responsible for
a subsequent misdeed. Hence, for example, if a bank
robber forces a customer in the bank to assist in the col-
lection of money by pointing a gun at him or her, then
that customer is not held responsible for the act. In the
law, duress can be inferred only given the possibility of
physical violence, and typically only extreme violence.
Thus, if the robber says, “Help me pick up the money or I
will hit you on the arm,” then duress would not be
presumed.
In the vignettes used here in the compliance studies,
the threats by the professor, nurse, or ticket manager did
not include physical violence. Nonetheless, it appears
that to the layperson, any threat of hardship is regarded
as duress and reduces perceptions of responsibility (see
Robinson & Darley, 1995, for other legal-layperson dis-
crepancies). Reward, on the other hand, does not have
the same status as a mitigator as does duress, and respon-
sibility is not lessened given an external positive incen-
tive to commit a transgression.
Although this explanation seems quite reasonable
and correct, it also has some characteristics of circularity
in that it merely states, again in perhaps a more general
language, what actually occurred. Hence, one can ques-
tion its value as an explanatory principle. Two other
approaches do not have this shortcoming and are more
grounded in psychological concepts and theories.
Lewinian theory. For Lewin (1938), a positive incentive
cannot exist without a corresponding need within the
person; that is, a need, desire, or want creates (imbues an
object with) a positive incentive (valence) that fulfills the
need state. Food, for example, is a positive incentive only
when the person is hungry, and a special raise may be
regarded as an incentive only for a person interested in
money. Positive environmental incentives and person
inferences are joined or linked in Lewinian theory; if the
individual does not want an object, then it has no incen-
tive value.
But Lewin was unable to easily apply this analysis to sit-
uations of negative valence. This was in part because a
negative incentive could not be construed as satisfying a
preexisting need state. Hence, aversive incentives in
Lewinian theory are not easily related to his ideas about
persisting internal states of tension that exist independ-
ent of the current perceived situation. It therefore would
be anticipated from Lewinian theory that there are
greater person inferences given compliance in a positive
rather than a negative motivational situation.
Prospect theory. Prospect theory, as formulated by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; see Tversky & Kahneman,
1992), is a theory of choice behavior, but nonetheless
may have some application in the present context. This
theory points out some of the violations made by classi-
cal, expected utility theory in regard to decision making.
Among the key elements of prospect theory that are not
incorporated into utility theory is that there are different
evaluations for gains and losses, such that losses loom
larger than gains. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state,
The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of
money appears to be greater than the pleasure associ-
ated with gaining the same amount. Moreover,
this . . . generally increaseswith thesizeof thestake. (p.279)
The second sentence in the above quote corresponds
with our data showing that responsibility differences are
greatest when conformity data (and, hence, “the size of
the stake”) are greatest.
If losses are weighted more than gains in choice, then
perhaps this also will be reflected in judgments of the
importance of the incentive valence in determining, and
mitigating, responsibility such that negative incentives
will be regarded as more mitigating than are positive
incentives. It must be noted, however, that there were
not compliance rating differences between our positive
and negative valenced situations, as prospect theory
would anticipate. Hence, the usefulness of this theory to
the present set of data is unclear, although it certainly
provides food for thought.
In sum, it is evident that the findings reported here
are extremely robust and can be considered facts (partic-
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ularly the multiple studies involving transgression com-
pliance). There also are theoretical explanations avail-
able, although none has been subject to direct testing.
What needs to be accomplished is the development of a
clear, distal theory that connects to the more proximal
attributional principles, which then link to the empirical
findings.
NOTES
1. The ANOVAs reported in this article are all with repeated mea-
sures on the factors Incentive Valence and Kind of Incentive. For the
sake of brevity, only the term ANOVA will be used. In addition, incen-
tive order, gender of participants, vignette order (Experiment 2), and
question order (Experiments 3, 4, and 5) had no effect on the depend-
ent variables in any of the experiments reported; hence, these variables
are not considered further.
2. Inasmuch as the design in Experiment 1 was a between-subjects
factorial, the correlations between ratings of compliance and per-
ceived responsibility were computed across vignettes; that is, the means
of the compliance ratings were correlated with the means of the
responsibility ratings. For Experiment 2, with the same between-
subjects design, no correlations are reported because of the small num-
ber of incentives.
3. In Experiments 3 through 5, the correlations were computed
using a within-subjects analysis. For each vignette, the correlations
between ratings of compliance and perceived responsibility,
dispositional causation, and/or situational causation, respectively,
were computed for each participant. Then, the average correlations,
across vignettes and participants, were calculated. A between-subjects
design analysis that used only one pair of responses for each subject
yielded virtually the same results.
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